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Abstract
This paper reports findings from the first systematic review of protocol studies focusing
specifically on conceptual design cognition, aiming to answer the following research
question:What is our current understanding of the cognitive processes involved in conceptual
design tasks carried out by individual designers? We reviewed 47 studies on architectural
design, engineering design and product design engineering. This paper reports 24 cognitive
processes investigated in a subset of 33 studies aligning with two viewpoints on the
nature of designing: (V1) design as search (10 processes, 41.7%); and (V2) design as
exploration (14 processes, 58.3%). Studies on search focused on solution search and
problem structuring, involving: long-term memory retrieval; working memory; operators
and reasoning processes. Studies on exploration investigated: co-evolutionary design;
visual reasoning; cognitive actions; and unexpected discovery and situated requirements
invention. Overall, considerable conceptual and terminological differences were observed
among the studies. Nonetheless, a common focus on memory, semantic, associative, visual
perceptual and mental imagery processes was observed to an extent. We suggest three
challenges for future research to advance the field: (i) developing general models/theories;
(ii) testing protocol study findings using objective methods conducive to larger samples
and (iii) developing a shared ontology of cognitive processes in design.
Key words: design cognition, conceptual design, protocol analysis, cognitive processes,
psychology
1. Introduction
In his work on the principles of engineering design, Hubka (1982, p. 3) notes that
designing ‘is a very personal activity, and can probably only be performed by one
person as an internal and somewhat subjective process’. The nature of design as
an internal cognitive activity has been a focus of design research for a number
of decades, with Cross (2001, p. 79) citing studies by Charles Eastman in the late
1960s as the starting point for much of the enquiry in this area. Since then, there
has been a proliferation of empirical studies on design cognition (Dinar et al.
2015). That is, the cognitive processes and information used by designers whilst
designing (Visser 2004). Dinar et al. (2015) reviewed empirical design cognition
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studies published over the past 25 years, noting that the majority have focused on
the early, relatively ambiguous stages of the design process known as conceptual
design (McNeill, Gero & Warren 1998; Suwa, Gero & Purcell 2000; Goel 2014).
However, in spite of the considerable body of empirical work, several authors
highlight that the nature of the cognitive processes involved in conceptual design
remains unclear (e.g. Dorst & Cross 2001; Jin & Benami 2010; Kim & Ryu 2014).
The systematic literature review is a commonly applied research method
in scientific fields. It involves gathering and synthesising all publications on
a particular phenomenon that meet prespecified inclusion criteria, ensuring
coverage of all relevant evidence and minimising bias. Systematic reviews
conducted in accordance with established guidelines (e.g. the PRISMA statement
(Moher et al. 2009)) are rigorous, transparent and reproducible, and therefore
held to the same standard as empirical research. A systematic review of
empirical design cognition studies could clarify the cognitive processes involved
in conceptual design, revealing common findings as well as differences in
perspectives. However, there has thus far been only a single systematic review
in this area (Jiang & Yen 2009), focusing largely on methodological aspects of
protocol analysis. Other authors provide extensive and informative reviews of the
area (Cross 2001; Coley, Houseman & Roy 2007; Dinar et al. 2015), but these are
not systematic and go beyond protocol studies to look at other approaches.
This paper reports findings from the first systematic review of protocol
studies focusing specifically on conceptual design cognition, aiming to answer
the following research question:What is our current understanding of the cognitive
processes involved in conceptual design tasks carried out by individual designers?
Protocol analysis involves interpreting subjective verbal reports of a designer’s
cognitive processing provided during or after completion of a design task
(Ericsson & Simon 1984; van Someren, Barnard & Sandberg 1994; Gero & Tang
2001), along with other aspects such as sketches and motor actions (Suwa, Purcell
& Gero 1998a; Park & Kim 2007). Whilst the merits of protocol analysis are
widely debated (Lloyd, Lawson & Scott 1995; Suwa & Tversky 1997; Sarkar &
Chakrabarti 2014), several authors suggest that it is one of the only methods
capable of directly revealing the internal processing of designers (van Someren
et al. 1994; Lloyd et al. 1995; Cross 2001; Sarkar &Chakrabarti 2014).We reviewed
and synthesised 47 protocol studies spanning architectural design, engineering
design and product design engineering, leading to the identification of 35 distinct
cognitive processes. Owing to space limitations, this paper reports a subset of 24
processes investigated in 33 articles, namely those aligningwith two viewpoints on
the nature of designing discussed in the broader literature (e.g. Logan & Smithers
1993;Maher&Tang 2003; Sim&Duffy 2003): (V1) design as search (10 processes,
41.7%), where designing is viewed as a search process transforming knowledge
states in a problem space; and (V2) design as exploration (14 processes, 58.3%),
where designing is viewed as an exploratory process operating between problem
and solution spaces. Our review forms part of a broader effort to provide a more
unified view of the field, and the remaining cognitive processes will be reported
in a future paper on this theme.
Methods and sample characteristics are outlined in Section 2, before the review
findings are explored in depth in Sections 3 and 4. A discussion is provided in
Section 5, and the paper concludes with a brief summary in Section 6.
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2. Methods and sample
Our approach was informed by the PRISMA statement, consisting of a generic
four-phase flow diagram and checklist providing formal guidance on conducting
and reporting systematic reviews (Moher et al. 2009). Figure 1 presents a flow
diagram for our review specifically. We undertook four of the recommended
review phases: (i) identification of candidate articles; (ii) screening the abstracts
of candidates for relevance; (iii) defining inclusion criteria for the review, and
using these to assess the eligibility of relevant full-text articles and (iv) qualitatively
synthesising the final sample of eligible articles. We consulted the checklist to
guide our reporting of the review findings, although we found several elements to
be irrelevant. In particular, Moher et al. (2009, p. 1) note that whilst the checklist
covers items relating to both qualitative synthesis and statistical meta-analysis
of reviewed articles, statistical methods ‘may or may not be used to analyze and
summarize the results of the included studies’. Meta-analysis was not appropriate
for this work owing to the qualitative nature of the findings reviewed (types of
cognitive process), and thus we employed qualitative synthesis alone.
The review centred on conceptual design tasks carried out by individual
designers; group-based tasks were excluded. To enable comparison and synthesis
of cognitive processes from different studies, we reviewed work from three
domains similar in terms of their approach to design problems and their
fundamental focus on function (i.e. the purpose of an artefact (Gero &
Kannengiesser 2004), as opposed to cognitive function (Chan et al. 2008)),
behaviour and structure (Hubka 1982; Gero 1990; Roozenburg & Eekels 1994):
architectural design (e.g. Goldschmidt 1991); engineering design (e.g. Lloyd
& Scott 1994) and product design engineering (e.g. Dorst & Cross 2001). We
consider the latter to include tasks incorporating industrial design requirements
(e.g. aesthetics, usability and ergonomics) as well as technical requirements.
Two design researchers with expertise in product design engineering (RDes1
and RDes2) selected and reviewed articles, receiving regular input from a
cognitive neuroscience researcher (RCog). The article selection process, sample
characteristics and qualitative synthesis approach are elaborated below.
2.1. Article selection process
Literature was gathered between 27th March 2015 and 3rd April 2015. Major
engineering/design and psychology databases were searched (Compendex,
Design and Applied Arts Index, Technology Research Database, Embase,
PsycINFO and PubMed), in addition to general scientific databases (Science
Direct and Web of Science). As Table 1 shows, we structured our search terms
into four groups reflecting the various aspects of our research question. Search
terms were generally applied across the title and abstract fields, and searches were
conducted across the broadest date range permitted by each database. Where
possible, searches were limited to English results only. A total of 6796 articles
were obtained (Figure 1).
As Figure 1 conveys, following de-duplication of search results we arrived at
4996 articles reporting a variety of study types, including controlled performance
tests, protocol studies, literature reviews, surveys and case studies. As discussed
in Section 1, we sought to answer our research question by identifying cognitive
processes from empirical studies. Given the general view that protocol analysis
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Figure 1. Flow diagram of systematic review process (based on generic diagram in Moher et al. (2009)).
is the most capable method for revealing such processes, we decided to focus the
reviewonprotocol studies alone. Tomaximise coverage, we ran follow-up searches
(9th October 2015) through the same databases searched initially using terms
reflective of protocol analysis (e.g. protocol study, think aloud and verbalisation).
During eligibility assessment (Figure 1), we evaluated full-text articles against six
inclusion criteria presented in Table 2. Conference papers published pre-2005
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Table 1. Structure of search terms
← AND→
Domain Participants Conceptual design Cognition
design architect OR creativ* OR cognit* OR
architects OR designing OR idea OR
designer OR drafting OR ideas OR
designers OR drawing OR mental OR
engineer OR ideat* OR percept OR
engineers OR imagery OR visual*
engineering sketch*
Table 2. Inclusion criteria
No. Criterion
1 Article must be published in English.
2 If constituting a conference paper, article must be published during or after
2005.
3 Article must report original research.
4 Study participants must be individual designers, i.e. not pairs or groups.
5 Study participants must carry out a conceptual design task within
the domains of engineering design, product design engineering or
architectural design.
6 Authors must identify cognitive processes involved in a conceptual design
task.
were typically republished in later journal articles and thus were excluded (e.g.
Suwa & Tversky 1996; Suwa, Gero & Purcell 1998b; Suwa et al. 2001). We
conducted reference list searches on included articles and assessed identified
candidates against the same eligibility criteria.
2.2. Sample characteristics
In total, 47 articles were included in the sample. Given the focus on a subset
of the review findings, only 33 are discussed in depth in this paper (denoted
by * in the reference list). However, the full sample may be downloaded as
supplementary material, and we report key characteristics of the sample in its
entirety here (visualised in Figure 2). Articles date from 1979 (Akin 1979) to
2015 (e.g. Yu & Gero 2015), with 24 (53.2%) published in the last decade. The
sample includes: (i) full protocol studies, where data was gathered, analysed and
reported in a single study (36, 76.6%); and (ii) analyses, where previously gathered
data was analysed and reported (11, 23.4%). Approximately 350 participants were
involved, ranging from aminimumof 1 to amaximumof 36 per study (mean = 7,
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Figure 2. Key statistics for study characteristics.
median= 6, standard deviation= 6.30). As Figure 2 shows, a sample size between
1 and 16 participants was most common. Broadly speaking, participants included
undergraduate, Master’s and PhD students, as well as practicing designers and
architects. Participants’ experience levels ranged from 0 to 38 years, although
inconsistent definitions of ‘experience’ were observed. In addition, several authors
did not provide information on participants’ experience (e.g. Chen & Zhao 2006;
Chandrasekera, Vo & D’Souza 2013).
We identified 45 distinct design tasks – 20 (44.4%) architectural design, 19
(42.2%) product design engineering and 6 (13.3%) engineering design. In certain
cases, the same task was studied by multiple authors (e.g. Suwa & Tversky 1997;
Suwa et al. 1998a, 2000; Suwa 2003). The following types of verbalisations were
analysed: (i) concurrent (32 studies, 68.1%); (ii) retrospective (11 studies, 23.4%)
or (iii) a combination of concurrent and retrospective (4 studies, 8.5%). Verbal
protocols ranged from 15 minutes to 600 minutes. Six authors omitted length
(Kavakli & Gero 2001; Chiu 2003; Maher & Tang 2003; Chen & Zhao 2006;Maher
& Kim 2006) and in one study, the task was self-paced (Sun, Yao & Carretero
2013). Video of external behaviour during the task was additionally recorded in
38 studies (84.4%), and sketches were gathered in 24 studies (51.1%).
2.3. Qualitative synthesis
Cognitive processes and viewpoints emerged from the sample and were
formalised through an iterative process of interpretation and refinement.
Throughout, cognitive processeswere identified on the basis of a definition offered
by Poldrack et al. (2011, p. 3) in the cognitive neuroscience literature: cognitive
processes are ‘entities that transform or operate onmental representations’.Mental
representations are defined as ‘mental entities that stand in relation to some
physical entity [. . .] or abstract concept (which could be another mental entity)’.
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An example of a mental representation is a mental image of a visual scene, and a
corresponding example of a cognitive process is ‘a process that searches a mental
representation of the visual scene for a particular object’.
Articles were initially split between RDes1 and RDes2, who read the full
text and identified types of processes studied across the sample (e.g. memory,
semantic processes, perception, mental imagery and higher-order reasoning
processes). These were discussed with RCog and continually refined. As the
categories emerged, RDes1 and RDes2 recorded specific descriptions of cognitive
processes pertaining to each in a common synthesis matrix. Several descriptions
subsumed multiple process types (discussed in Section 5). Finally, RDes1
analysed the synthesis matrix to identify commonalities in the descriptions
provided by different authors (e.g. similarities in descriptive terms and the
nature of the representations related to processes), and abstracted more general
descriptions where appropriate. The final list of processes was reviewed by all
team members.
During the above process, both RDes1 and RDes2 observed persistent
differences in the terminology and concepts applied to describe cognition in
different studies. These were interpreted as reflecting two viewpoints (V) on
the nature of designing: (V1) search, where designing is seen as a largely linear
sequence of operators effecting changes to design knowledge states; and (V2)
exploration, where designing is viewed as an iterative and situated process of
interpreting the problem, proposing solutions and restructuring the problem
and/or solution in response to features perceived in each (Newell & Simon 1972;
Logan & Smithers 1993; Maher & Tang 2003; Sim & Duffy 2003; Visser 2006). In
addition, numerous authors were found to discuss cognition more generally in
relation to design activities (V3). Examples of design activities identifiable in the
sample include problem analysis (Jin & Benami 2010), concept generation (Jin &
Chusilp 2006), synthesis (McNeill et al. 1998), concept evaluation (Jin & Chusilp
2006) and decision making (Kim & Ryu 2014).
To provide a coherent framework for reporting the review findings, RDes1
assigned each of the articles to one of the above three viewpoints. Articles
were searched for relevant keywords, e.g.: (V1) search, problem structuring,
state transformation and operator; (V2) exploration, perception and situatedness
and (V3) activities, concept evaluation and concept generation. Each article
was interpreted by RDes1 and classified as pertaining primarily to V1, V2 or
V3 based on the usage of associated keywords by the authors. For example,
articles explicitly aiming to characterise search/problem structuring processes
and evidence operators using protocol data, but making contextual references to
keywords associated with design activities, were assigned to V1 (e.g. Stauffer &
Ullman 1991; Goel 1995; Liikkanen & Perttula 2009). Articles focusing primarily
on the conceptualisation and study of exploratory processes while making brief
references to search keywords in background and discussion sections were
assigned toV2 (e.g. Dorst &Cross 2001;Maher&Tang 2003). Note that whilst this
activity was largely based on the judgement of RDes1, the resulting classification
was reviewed by all team members and refined where necessary.
In total, 35 distinct cognitive processes were identified from articles on search
(10), exploration (14) and design activities (13), with 2 processes overlapping
search and activities, hence 35. This paper reports the 24 processes investigated
in studies on design as search (Section 3) and exploration (Section 4), with design
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activities covered in a future paper. The processes are presented in Table 8 in
Appendix A, where each is assigned a code identifier consisting of a viewpoint
(V) and process (P) number, e.g. V1P1. We adopted the organisation and structure
conveyed in Table 8 largely because it aligns with the manner in which processes
are discussed by the authors investigating them. In turn, we found it to be themost
conducive to clear explanation of the review findings. However, we acknowledge
that other researchers may have different interpretations. In this respect, the
review raises important ontological questions about how cognitive processes
should be defined and organised for study in design research (Section 5.2).
3. Design as search
As discussed in Section 2, designing may be viewed as both a linear search
process (V1) and an iterative exploratory process (V2). This section presents
the 10 cognitive processes we identified from studies aligning with V1, which
are summarised in Table 8 in Appendix A. For reference purposes, the code
identifying each process in Table 8 is appended in superscript to the first mention
of each process throughout Sections 3 and 4.
3.1. Memory, operators, solution search and reasoning
Studies on design as search tend to view the designer as an information processing
system (Chan 1990; Stauffer & Ullman 1991; Dorst & Dijkhuis 1995), where
elementary processes called operatorsV 1P1 are enacted to transform information
from input to output states (Stauffer & Ullman 1991); that is, to effect state
transformations (Akin 1979; Goel 1995). The range of operators identified from
our sample is summarised in Table 2; a detailed elaboration would contravene
article space limitations. Note that instances are presented as stated by authors
and have not been abstracted, hence similarities may be observed in certain
cases (e.g. create and generate, no decision and suspend, etc.). Nonetheless,
they may be broadly grouped into four categories reflecting various design
activities: information gathering; comprehending, representing and structuring
information; generating and synthesising; and evaluating and decision making.
Several authors were found to provide evidence supporting high-level operator
execution patterns for search and process management, termed search methods
(Stauffer & Ullman 1991) and control strategies (Chan 1990), respectively (e.g.
Chan 1990; Stauffer & Ullman 1991; Goel 1995; Kim et al. 2007). These are also
briefly summarised in Table 3.
Chan (1990) suggests that during designing, a designer firstly retrieves a
schema relevant to the design problem from long-term memoryV 1P2. Schemas
may be viewed as abstract knowledge structures, containing both declarative
knowledge about design problems and procedural knowledge in the form of
operators (Ball, Ormerod & Morley 2004). For instance, Akin (1979) suggests
that schemas comprise an input state (declarative knowledge), an output state
(declarative knowledge) and the set of operators required to convert the input
state to the output state (procedural knowledge). Following schema retrieval,
operators are extracted and activated inworkingmemoryV 1P3, which supports the
maintenance and manipulation of information (Chan 1990; Stauffer & Ullman
1991). In addition to information retrieved from long-term memory, certain
operators serve to gather information from external sources (see Table 3). The
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Table 3. Summary of operators, search methods and control strategies identified from reviewed studies
Instance Author
OPERATORS Information gathering:
Data input Chan 1990
Enquiry – instantiate/reinstantiate
symbols to address a need for
information.
Akin 1979
Select information (from various
sources).
Stauffer & Ullman 1991
Comprehending, representing, and structuring information:
Generalisation – associate an
attribute to a supra-symbol.
Akin 1979
Goal definition – define goals or
sub-goals.
Inference – hypothesise new symbol
relations.
Instantiation – save new symbol as
part of problem representation.
Integration – further specify current
solution state.
Representation – create an external
representation.
Rule application (arithmetic rules,
assertions, and logical deductions).
Chan 1990
Generating and synthesising:
Create – generation of information
that appears spontaneously.
Stauffer & Ullman 1991
Generate Goel 1995
Modify
Propose
Specification – produce a partial
solution or partial specification.
Akin 1979
Evaluating and decision making:
Accept – add new information to
solution state.
Akin 1979; Goel 1995
Calculate – infer new information by
combining existing information.
Stauffer & Ullman 1991
Compare – determine compatibility
of proposals against constraints.
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Table 3. (continued)
Evaluate Goel 1995
Justify
No decision
Patch – add or combine information
without making it less abstract.
Stauffer & Ullman 1991
Refine – make information more
specific and less abstract.
Reject – determine unsatisfactory
proposal.
Stauffer & Ullman 1991; Goel 1995
Simulate – represent information at
proper level of abstraction in order
to relate it.
Stauffer & Ullman 1991
Suspend – terminate decision
without definite conclusion.
SEARCH
METHODS
Application of presolution
model/pre-compiled solution.
Akin 1979; Chan 1990
Deductive thinking Stauffer & Ullman 1991
Divide-and-conquer Akin 1979
Generate-and-improve Stauffer & Ullman 1991
Generate (or hypothesise)-and-test Akin 1979; Chan 1990; Stauffer & Ullman 1991
Hill-climbing Akin 1979
Induction
Means-end analysis Akin 1979; Chan 1990; Stauffer & Ullman 1991
Most-constrained-first Akin 1979
Obvious-solution-first
Pattern matching
CONTROL
STRATEGIES
Back-up strategy Chan 1990
Error correction
Limited commitment mode strategy Goel 1995; Kim et al. 2007
Scenario development Chan 1990
Use of image units, where an image
unit is ‘a specific architectural form
that is developed by the client’.
designer interacts with the external environment via receptors and effectors,
which receive afferent information and exert external effects, respectively (Newell
& Simon 1972; Stauffer & Ullman 1991). These interactions may involve an
external memory system – that is, resources such as sketches and notepads where
ideas and thoughts may be recorded and stored externally, as well as information
sources such as textbooks, databases, etc. (Stauffer & Ullman 1991; Goel 1995).
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Figure 3. The process of solution search.
Collectively, the above processes may be described as ‘a search through [. . .]
knowledge states guided by information accumulated during the search’ (Chan
1990, p. 64). That is, the process of solution searchV 1P4, which is considered to
be delimited by a problem space. Conceptually, the problem space constitutes ‘a
representation of [a designer’s] task environment’ (Newell & Simon 1972, p. 59),
incorporating knowledge of an initial problem state, a goal state and all possible
intermediate design states (Newell & Simon 1972; Chan 1990; Stauffer & Ullman
1991; Goel 1995). Solution search may be represented within this space as shown
in Figure 3, i.e. a series of state transformations originating in the problem
state and culminating in the goal state (Chan 1990; Stauffer & Ullman 1991).
Desired states to be attained during the search are specified in design goals (Akin
1979; Chan 1990; Stauffer & Ullman 1991). As Figure 3 illustrates, implementing
constraints reduces the extent of the space to be searched (Chan 1990; Goel 1995),
which is potentially large owing to the ill-defined and/or unstructured nature of
design problems (Chan 1990).
Goel (1995, p. 119), proposes that solution searchmay bemore fully described
in terms of (i) lateral and (ii) vertical transformations (Figure 4). Lateral
transformations involve ‘movement from one idea to a slightly different idea’,
and vertical transformations ‘movement from one idea to a more detailed version
of the same idea’. Goel (1995, p. 126) identified supporting evidence for both in a
practicing architect’s protocol. Lateral transformations are argued to be ‘necessary
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Figure 4. Lateral and vertical transformations within a problem space.
for widening the problem space’, whilst vertical transformations ‘deepen the
problem space’ as Figure 4 illustrates. More recently, Chen & Zhao (2006, p. 258)
characterised the ‘cognition mode’ of automobile designers in terms of lateral and
vertical transformations.
Eckersley (1988) and Lloyd & Scott (1994) additionally highlight the role of
deductive and inductive inferenceV 1P5 in a search context, i.e. the process by
which logical judgements are made based on pre-existing information rather than
direct observations.More specifically, several authors consider the role of a type of
induction known as analogical reasoningV 1P6, referring to the use of information
about known semantic concepts to understand newly presented concepts (Ball
et al. 2004; Liikkanen & Perttula 2009). Ball et al. (2004, pp. 495–507) found
that this may occur spontaneously during designing via ‘the recognition-primed
application’ of knowledge schema retrieved from long-term memory. However,
problems ‘resistant to schema-based processing’ may instead be solved via a
conscious process of mapping solutions to previous problems onto the current
problem. The latter may be viewed as a form of case-based reasoningV 1P7, where
new problems are solved on the basis of solutions to similar past problems (Chiu
2003; Ball et al. 2004).
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3.2. Problem structuring
Akin (1979, p. 204) examined operator usage by a professional architect and
concluded that prior to solution search, designers may employ a different set
of operators to develop ‘an internally assimilated representation of the problem
context’. This process is frequently termed problem structuringV 1P8. Goel (1995,
p. 114) observed that whilst ‘problem structuring occurs at the beginning of
the task, where one would expect it’, it ‘may also recur periodically as needed’.
Similarly, Chan (1990, p. 69) found that problem restructuring may be triggered
by a ‘critical problem situation’ during solution search, e.g. a decision to abandon
a particular solution. Problem restructuring results in changes to the solution
path or problem structure, i.e. ‘the format of knowledge representation, goal
plan and constraint establishment’. With respect to goal plan formation, Lloyd &
Scott (1994), Liikkanen & Perttula (2009) and Lee, Gu & Williams (2014) study
problem decompositionV 1P9, i.e. the process of breaking a design problem down
into sub-problems by specifying sub-goals (Liikkanen & Perttula 2009).
The process of problem reframingV 1P10 investigated by Akin & Akin (1996)
in the context of sudden mental insight (SMI) may be considered to relate to
problem structuring, although it pertains to the specification of problem frames as
opposed to goals, constraints, and requirements. SMI refers to ‘the moment where
the designer gets an insight into the design solution and/or the problem frame’
(Chandrasekera et al. 2013, p. 195), or what may colloquially be termed the ‘aha!
response’ (Akin & Akin 1996, p. 344). Akin & Akin (1996) argue that to invoke
SMI, designersmust first recognise restrictive frames of reference and then specify
new frames conducive to solving the problem. They propose that suitable frames
of reference are determined using declarative and procedural domain knowledge
retrieved from memory.
4. Design as exploration
In addition to the 10 cognitive processes discussed in Section 3, we identified
14 processes from studies aligning with the viewpoint that design constitutes an
iterative exploratory process (V2). These are summarised inTable 8 inAppendixA
and discussed in the following sub-sections.
4.1. Co-evolutionary design
A key characteristic of problem spaces in design as search is that the nature of
the problem to be addressed, i.e. the search focus, does not change significantly
over time (Dorst & Cross 2001; Maher & Tang 2003). An alternative perspective
on design problems views them as evolutionary, i.e. subject to reinterpretation
and reformulation over time as a solution emerges (Maher & Tang 2003; Yu
et al. 2014). This is formalised in the co-evolution model of design, where the
designer’s task environment is represented as two knowledge spaces (Figure 5):
(i) the problem space, incorporating problem requirements and forming a basis for
solution evaluation and (ii) the solution space, encompassing design solutions and
providing a foundation for evaluating requirements (Maher & Tang 2003). Design
is described as a co-evolutionary processV 2P1, i.e. one that ‘explores the spaces
of problem requirements and design solutions iteratively’ resulting in parallel
evolution of design problems and solutions (Maher & Tang 2003, p. 48). Over
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Figure 5. Co-evolution model of design. Reprinted from Design Studies, Vol 22/Issue 5, Dorst, K. and Cross,
N., Creativity in the design process: co-evolution of problem–solution, pp. 425–437, Copyright (2001), with
permission from Elsevier.
the course of this process, new variables may be added into each space through
interactions between the two (e.g. new requirements and potential solutions). The
co-evolutionmodelwas originally proposed in computational formbyMaher et al.
(1996) and studied as a cognitive model by Dorst & Cross (2001), Maher & Tang
(2003), Maher & Kim (2006) and Yu et al. (2014).
4.2. Sketch-based design exploration
In studies on sketch-based exploratory design, problem/solution interactionsmay
be understood in terms of situatedness: the notion that what a designer draws and
perceives in their sketches affects their interpretation of the problem and vice versa
(Suwa et al. 1998a; Reber 2011; Yu, Gu & Lee 2013). A prolific model of situated
designing is the situated FBS framework (Gero & Kannengiesser 2004), applied
to code protocols by authors in the sample (e.g. Yu et al. 2013). The following
sub-sections discuss 13 cognitive processes we identified from sketching studies,
along with findings from several studies on the purpose of conceptual design
sketching.
4.2.1. Visual reasoning
Visual reasoningV 2P2 may be broadly defined as the process of generating and
reasoning about ideas whilst engaged in sketching. It is conceptualised in twoways
by different authors in the sample (Goldschmidt 1991; Park & Kim 2007). Firstly,
Goldschmidt (1991) describes the process as a ‘dialectical’ reasoning pattern
continually shifting between two modes:
• Seeing asV 2P3 (SA), i.e. the process of proposing attributes and properties
for a design based on analogies between sketch elements and mental
representations (e.g. semantic concepts and past experiences). Suwa et al.
(1998a) study a similar process called re-interpretationV 2P4: assigning new
functions to parts of a design through interpreting visuo-spatial elements
and relations. Reinterpretation is classed as a type of functional cognitive
actionV 2P11, discussed in Section 4.2.2.
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Figure 6. Example of Goldschmidt’s (1991) dialectical visual reasoning pattern.
• Seeing thatV 2P3 (ST), i.e. the process of rationalising design decisions
relating to proposals developed through SA.
Goldschmidt (1991, p. 125) characterised design moves (acts of design
reasoning) performed by eight practicing architects during a sketching task as
involving either ST or SA. Characterisation was based on arguments, or ‘rational
utterance[s]’ considered to reveal reasoning modes. Participants were indeed
observed to alternate between ST and SA throughout the task (Figure 6). Design
moveswere either (i) unimodal, i.e. characterised by onemode, or (ii)multimodal,
i.e. characterised by two modes. Modal changes were observed in both directions,
i.e. from ST to SA and vice versa. Goldschmidt (1991, p. 140) argues that this
dialectical pattern of reasoning is ‘rather unique’ to sketching activities. Whilst ST
and SA may be observed in designers working without sketching or focusing on
abstract visual displays, ‘they are not organised in the dialectical pattern’ illustrated
in Figure 6. Regarding the impact of different sketching tools in this respect, Won
(2001) observed a dialectical pattern in the visual reasoning of designers carrying
out both freehand and computer-aided sketching tasks, with the latter involving
more frequent shifts between ST and SA.
More recently, Park & Kim (2007) proposed a visual reasoning model
(Figure 7) that formalises three interacting sub-processes termed seeingV 2P5,
imaginingV 2P6 and drawingV 2P7:
• Seeing involves perceiving, analysing and interpreting visual information
from external representations, resulting in the merging of ‘empirical
knowledge’ (e.g. test information) with ‘visual knowledge’ from long-term
memory (Park & Kim 2007, p. 4).
• Imagining involves generating new internal images, which may be
transformed according to schemas in long-term memory and maintained
for externalisation (see below). Images may be generated using perceptual
information produced by the process of seeing, and/or schemas.
• Drawing involves evaluating and confirming internal representations, and
externalising such representations (e.g. through sketching).
Protocols gathered from an expert and a student designer were considered
to provide evidence for all three of the above processes and their interactive
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Figure 7.Visual reasoning model (Park & Kim 2007). Copyright (2007), The Design
Society; reprinted with permission.
nature. Park & Kim (2007, p. 10) claim the greatest interaction corresponded
with the moment at which the ‘creative idea’ was generated, and in turn conclude
that process interaction in visual reasoning leads to the emergence of creativity.
However, it seems neither participant nor output creativity was assessed during
the study.
4.2.2. Cognitive actions
During visual reasoning, designers think of and perceive various kinds of
information in their sketches. Suwa & Tversky (1997, p. 388) propose four
information categories: (i) emergent properties, e.g. spaces, things, shapes/angles
and sizes; (ii) spatial relations, e.g. local and global relations; (iii) functional
relations, e.g. practical roles, abstract features and views and (iv) background
knowledge. Whilst the authors acknowledge interdependencies between these
categories, they are not elaborated. However, Suwa et al. (1998a, pp. 458–459)
argue that understanding these relationships is ‘key to understanding the ways
in which designers cognitively interact with their own sketches’. Building on
the above categories, they propose a set of cognitive actionsV 2P8 – that is,
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interdependent cognitive processes argued to be involved in sketching. These are
organised into four categories depending on the type of information they relate
to (Table 4): (i) physicalV 2P9 actions (sensory information); (ii) perceptualV 2P10
actions (perceptual information, specifically visual); and (iii) functionalV 2P11
and (iv) conceptualV 2P12 actions (semantic information). The categories were
developed from the perspective that ‘information coming into human cognitive
processes is processed first sensorily, then perceptually and semantically’.
Suwa et al. (1998a, p. 458) claim the proposed actions are supported by ‘an
enormous amount of concrete examples’ identified from an architect’s protocol.
However, it is worth highlighting that the meaning of ‘cognitive action’ from a
cognitive psychology perspective is somewhat ambiguous. The term is not clearly
defined by Suwa et al. (1998a, p. 455), who appear to use it interchangeably
with the (also undefined) phrase ‘design action’. They also argue that a designer’s
‘cognitive behaviours’ may be represented as a set of interrelated cognitive actions.
These phrases are problematic for psychologists, who typically refer to internal
mental processes as ‘cognitive’ and view ‘action’ and ‘behaviour’ as external
phenomena. Suwa et al. (1998a, p. 472) further suggest that cognitive actions may
be used for ‘dissecting the structures of a designer’s cognitive processes’, suggesting
they constitute interdependent cognitive processes. We adopt this interpretation;
however, it may be seen in Table 4 that the nature of the actions as either ‘cognitive’
or ‘behavioural’ in the psychology sense is frequently unclear. For instance, the
cognitive actions of looking at previous depictions (physical action) and attending
to visual features of sketch elements (perceptual action) likely involve cognitive
processes such as selective attention and visual perception, but the actual acts of
looking with the eyes and working on sketch elements with a pencil constitute
external behaviour.
As discussed further in Section 4.2.4, Suwa et al. (1998a) gained preliminary
insights into the purpose of sketches by coding an architect’s cognitive actions.
Cognitive actions have also been examined by several other authors for varying
purposes:
• Kavakli & Gero (2002) coded protocols from expert and student architects,
revealing differences in cognitive action trends over time and correlations
between actions. For instance, the expert executed 6 simultaneous cognitive
actions whilst the student executed 30. Drawing, perceptual, and functional
actions and goals (Table 4) were also found to be more strongly correlated
for the expert than the student. Kavakli & Gero (2001) offer potential
explanations for these differences based on mental imagery and working
memory theory.
• Bilda & Demirkan (2003, p. 49) analysed six architects’ cognitive actions
while sketching in digital versus traditional media, and found ‘designers
were more effective in using time, conceiving the problem, producing
alternative solutions and in perceiving the visual–spatial features and the
organizational relations of a design in traditional media’.
• Sun et al. (2013) analysed protocols gathered from 15 engineering students
and proposed a relationship between cognitive efficiency and the number
of: (i) cognitive actions executed; and (ii) transitions among different action
categories and therefore, information processing levels. Participants with
17/36
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dsj.2017.11
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Glasgow Library, on 13 Sep 2017 at 11:19:46, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
Table 4. Cognitive action categories proposed by Suwa et al. (1998a)
Information
processing
level
Cognitive
action
category
Cognitive
actions
Description Examples of evidence
from protocols and
sketches
Sensory Physical D-action Make depictions Lines, circles, arrows,
words
L-action Look at previous
depictions.
—————————
M-action Other physical actions Move a pen, move
elements, gesture
Perceptual Perceptual P-action Attend to visual
features of elements.
Shapes, sizes, textures
Attend to spatial
relations among
elements.
Proximity, alignment,
intersection
Organise or compare
elements.
Grouping, similarity,
contrast
Semantic Functional F-action Explore the issues of
interactions between
artefacts and
people/nature.
Functions, circulation
of people, views,
lighting conditions
Consider psychological
reactions of people.
Fascination,
motivation,
cheerfulness
Conceptual E-action Make preferential and
aesthetic evaluations.
Like–dislike, good–bad,
beautiful–ugly
G-action Set up goals —————————
K-action Retrieve knowledge —————————
higher cognitive efficiency executed more perceptual actions and fewer
conceptual actions, and exhibited more transitions from the physical to
perceptual level but fewer transitions from the functional to conceptual level
(Table 4).
4.2.3. Unexpected discovery and situated requirements invention
Suwa et al. (2000, p. 540) suggest that when a designer sketches a new feature
intended to spatially relate to existing sketch features, unintended spatial relations
are also ‘automatically produced’ regardless of whether they are actually heeded.
Later in the task, visuo-spatial features created by these unintended relations
may be ‘discovered in an unexpected way’ by the designer – a process termed
unexpected discoveryV 2P13, and classed as a perceptual action (Table 4). Suwa
et al. (2000) propose three types (Figure 8), namely discovery of: (i) the shape,
size or texture of a sketch element; (ii) a spatial or organisational relation among
elements and (iii) a space existing between elements, an example of what may be
termed ‘figure-ground reversal’ in perception research (Suwa et al. 2000, p. 546).
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Figure 8. Types of unexpected discovery identified by Suwa et al. (2000).
An architect’s protocol revealed that throughout the task, unexpected discoveries
were correlated with cognitive actions to set up goals focusing on new issues,
which are then abstracted and carried through the design process as requirements.
Since the invention of requirements by a designer in this manner is ‘situated
in the environment in which they design’ – that is, affected by their perception
of sketches and the general context – the term situated inventionV 2P14 or ‘S-
invention’ is adopted (Suwa et al. 2000, pp. 539–547). Suwa (2003, p. 222) refers to
unexpected discovery and S-invention in an overall sense as ‘problem-finding’, i.e.
‘discovering and formulating one’s ownproblem to be solved’. Inmore recentwork,
Yu et al. (2013, p. 411) compared architects’ responses to unexpected discoveries
in parametric versus geometric design environments.
4.2.4. The purpose of sketching
Generally, as Sections 4.2.1–4.2.3 show, sketching is considered to play a
fundamental role in solution development during conceptual design. Suwa et al.
(1998a, p. 483) conclude based on an architect’s observed cognitive actions that
sketches serve several purposes:
• an ‘external memory in which to leave ideas for later inspection’;
• a ‘provider of visual cues for association of functional issues’ and
• a ‘physical setting in which functional thoughts are constructed on the fly
in a situated way’.
However, several studies suggest that designers can still successfully develop a
solution when unable to sketch. For example, Athavankar (1997, p. 38) analysed
a protocol gathered from a blindfolded designer unable to sketch during a task.
They suggest that compared with the use of mental imagery alone, sketching
‘makes lesser demands on the cognitive resource that would be otherwise spent
on maintaining the mental image’, supporting the idea that sketches may serve
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as an external memory. Nonetheless, the overall conclusion is that removing the
ability to sketch did not limit the ‘ability to propose design moves, reflect upon
them, transform ideas into new spatial configurations, propose and compare
alternatives, evaluate them, take decisions and argue them out’. Athavankar’s
findings are supported in varying degrees by three later studies:
• Bilda, Gero & Purcell (2006, p. 604) found no significant differences in
‘design outcome scores, total number of cognitive actions (except for recall
activity) and overall density of idea production’ in protocols gathered
from three architects engaged in tasks under blindfolded and full-vision
conditions.
• Based on protocols gathered from six architects under the same conditions
as above, Bilda & Gero (2007, p. 364) conclude that sketching serves to
off-load visuo-spatial working memory. However, they also conclude that
for expert designers, the ‘use of tacit knowledge and the pre-existing chunks
of spatial models from long-termmemory could support the design process
without the use of externalizations’.
• Athavankar, Bokil &Guruprasad (2008, p. 338) analysed protocols gathered
from four blindfolded architects who were free to move around a room
whilst completing a design task. Participants were observed to ‘work
with remarkable dexterity in spite of (the) artificially imposed eye mask
constraint’, employing two strategies where they either: (i) ‘moved in the real
world space and carried the site (of the building) with them in their mind’s
eye’; or (ii) ‘physically moved and paced within the stationary visualization
of the site which they created in their mind’s eye’ (Athavankar et al. 2008,
p. 329).
5. Discussion
In Sections 3 and 4, we explored 24 cognitive processes aligning with two
viewpoints on the nature of designing: search and exploration. These were
identified through a systematic review of protocol studies aiming to answer the
following research question: What is our current understanding of the cognitive
processes involved in conceptual design tasks carried out by individual designers?
In this section, key observations relating to the research question are discussed,
along with future work and the limitations of the review.
5.1. Key observations
Akey advantage of a systematic review is its capability to expose common findings
and differences in perspectives. In this respect, studies aligning with search and
exploration appear to cover similar design activities at a high level. However,
they vary considerably regarding the concepts and terminology used to describe
the cognitive processes involved, as Table 5 illustrates in the context of four
typical conceptual design activities (Sim & Duffy 2003; Jin & Chusilp 2006).
Note that the mapping of cognitive processes to design activities in Table 5 is
largely based on interpretation rather than explicit statements by authors. That
is, similarities we identified in the definitions and outputs of design activities
and cognitive processes. For example, generation activities involve producing
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Table 5. Concepts and terminology used to describe cognitive processes involved in conceptual design
activities
Design activity Described in terms of: ID1
Problem structuring/
analysis
Problem decomposition V1P9
Operators executed prior to and/or during solution search, e.g.
goal definition and instantiation (Akin 1979).
V1P1
Structuring of problems in a problem space in co-evolutionary
design.
V2P1
Conceptual cognitive actions to set up goals. V2P12
Situated invention of design requirements during sketching. V2P14
Generation and
synthesis
Operators executed during solution search, e.g. create,
specification, integration, generate and modify (Goel 1995; Akin
& Akin 1996).
V1P1
Inductive and deductive reasoning, including analogical and
case-based reasoning.
V1P5 –V1P7
Structuring of solutions in a solution space in co-evolutionary
design.
V2P1
Visual reasoning processes, e.g. the process of ‘seeing as’ and the
interrelated processes of seeing, imagining, and drawing.
V2P2 – V2P7
Evaluation Operators executed during solution search, e.g. compare,
evaluate, and simulate (Stauffer & Ullman 1991; Goel 1995).
V1P1
Evaluation of solutions based on requirements in a problem
space in co-evolutionary design.
V2P1
Conceptual cognitive actions to make preferential and aesthetic
evaluations.
V2P12
Decision making Operators applied during solution search, e.g. accept, reject, and
no decision (Stauffer & Ullman 1991; Goel 1995).
V1P1
The process of ‘seeing that’, i.e. rationalising design decisions
relating to proposals generated through ‘seeing as’.
V2P3
1 Code identifier (ID) elements: V = viewpoint number; P = process number. Please refer to Table 8 (Appendix A)
for a list of authors investigating each process.
ideas for solutions to design problems (Jin & Chusilp 2006). The integration
and specification operators (cognitive processes) are described as producing
spontaneous information and partial solutions, respectively (Table 5). Thus, we
interpreted both as pertaining to the generation of ideas.
Variation between viewpoints may be at least partly explained by differences
in two fundamental design cognition paradigms, namely: (i) the problem solving
paradigm, founded in Newell and Simon’s theories andmodels of human problem
solving (e.g. Newell & Simon 1972; Simon 1996); and (ii) the reflective paradigm,
influenced heavily by Schon’swork on reflection-in-action (e.g. Schön 1983; Schon
& Wiggins 1992). Each paradigm’s key perspectives (Dorst & Dijkhuis 1995) are
presented in Table 6. It may be seen from Sections 3 and 4 that studies on search
align primarily with the problem solving paradigm, whilst those on exploration
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Table 6. Key perspectives associated with design cognition paradigms
Perspectives on the nature of:
(based on Dorst & Dijkhuis (1995, pp. 262–263))
Paradigms: Designer Design problem Designing Design knowledge
Problem
solving
Information
processor in an
objective reality.
Ill-defined,
unstructured,
stable.
A rational
search process.
Design procedures
and scientific laws.
Reflective Person constructing
their reality.
Essentially
unique,
evolutionary.
Reflective
interaction with
broader design
situation.
When to apply what
procedure or
component of
knowledge.
align more closely with the reflective paradigm. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising
that the two sets differ so considerably.
In spite of the above differences, several broad commonalities between
viewpoints may be observed. For instance, as Table 7 illustrates, studies on both
search and exploration suggest the involvement of long-term memory retrieval
in conceptual design tasks. Semantic (i.e. pertaining to meaning) and associative
processes also appear to be commonly investigated, along with visual perception.
Notably, we found that mental imagery is discussed fairly extensively in studies
on exploration, but receives virtually no attention in studies on search. One
potential explanation for this is the perspective that in design as search, a designer
constitutes an information processing system in an objective reality (Table 6). In
contrast, studies on design as exploration tend to view the designer as a person
constructing their own reality (Table 6) in line with the notion of situatedness.
The involvement ofmemory, semantic and associative processes in conceptual
design is consistent with creative ideation accounts in the broader psychology
and neuroscience literature (e.g. Mednick 1962; Runco & Chand 1995; Mumford,
Medeiros & Partlow 2012; Benedek et al. 2013; Beaty et al. 2014; Abraham &
Bubic 2015). Nonetheless, the above inconsistencies make it difficult to rationalise
the range of cognitive processes identified from the sample. This obscures the
fundamental nature of the processes studied by authors, and makes it difficult
to identify specific avenues for future work. Difficulties in comparing and
synthesising studies are compounded by terminology with little meaning in
psychology, such as seeing as (Goldschmidt 1991), unexpected discovery (Suwa
et al. 2000) and cognitive action (Suwa et al. 1998a). The use of such terms is
particularly curious in the case of cognitive processes that are well established and
clearly defined in psychology research. For instance, the process of unexpected
discovery is likely an instance of what psychologists call (visual) perceptual re-
organisation: the process of re-organising visual information to reveal previously
unseen features and relations of visuo-spatial representations (Bruce, Green &
Georgeson 2003; Tversky 2014). Nonetheless, the term ‘unexpected discovery’ is
preferred by Suwa et al. (2000). Another issue impeding rationalisation is that
the terminology applied by authors appears at times to subsume multiple process
types. For example, the process of seeing as seems to refer to the interaction of
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visual perception, semantic processing and mental imagery processing during
sketching (Goldschmidt 1991).
5.2. Towards general formalisms
Dinar et al. (2015, p. 9) attribute the lack of standard approaches and
interpretations across the field of design cognition research to a dearth of
‘cognitive models and theories of designer thinking’. In this respect, we suggest
that the inconsistencies discussed in Section 5.1 expose a lack of general models
and theories of conceptual design cognition. That is, formalisms that describe
design cognition using an established common language, and have explanatory
and predictive capability with respect to the general population of designers.
Although general cognitive models of creativity such as the Geneplore model
(Finke, Ward & Smith 1992) have been influential in design research (e.g. Jin
& Benami 2010), they are not models of designing per se. Given that general
formalisms are central to generating and testing scientific predictions about design
cognition, and explaining the phenomena involved, their development constitutes
a major challenge critical to advancing the field.
Models and theories of the type outlined above must ultimately be informed
by generalisable and statistically significant findings about cognitive processes
and their interactions during design tasks. In this respect, whilst protocol
analysis may be well suited to exploratory investigations in underdeveloped
research areas, a key question is whether it is the best method for advancing
the field towards general scientific formalisms. A conclusive answer is beyond
our scope, but we shall comment briefly on some observations arising from our
sample. Awell-documented limitation of protocol analysis is its resource-intensive
nature, arising from the involvement of extensive qualitative data processing.
Consequently, protocol studies are frequently limited to small samples (Dinar et al.
2015). Thismeans that whilst statistically significant results may be obtained, they
are subject to a high margin of uncertainty (Button et al. 2013). In a sample of 1,
uncertainty is so high that the significance (or otherwise) of results is essentially
irrelevant. Of the 33 articles reviewed in Sections 3 and 4, 64% employed a sample
of five participants or less; 33% employed samples of two or less. Furthermore,
column 4 in Table 8 demonstrates that of the 24 cognitive processes we identified,
50% were supported by a mean sample of five participants or less, and 17% by
a mean sample of one or two. Thus, a considerable fraction of protocol study
findings to date are likely subject to high uncertainty margins.
Based on the above, we suggest testing the results of protocol studies using
methods conducive to larger samples is a key challenge for design cognition
research. One potential approach, typical of cognitive psychology, is the use of
controlled experiments employing cognitive tests and outcome measures (Dinar
et al. 2015). This permits considerably larger samples owing to the quantitative
nature of the methods; however, there are other limitations including reduced
ecological validity, time restrictions, a lack of suitable tests and metrics, and
reduced richness of the data generated (Shah, Smith & Vargas-Hernandez 2003;
Shah et al. 2012, 2013; Khorshidi, Shah & Woodward 2014; Dinar et al. 2015).
Thus, effectively combining rich, qualitative approaches like protocol analysiswith
more objective quantitative approaches may be a more fundamental challenge for
design cognition researchers.
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Table 7. Commonly studied cognitive processes
Type of process Examples of cognitive process descriptions from reviewed studies ID1
Long-term
memory
Retrieval of operators, past design problems, and other information from
long-term memory.
V1P2
Retrieving knowledge (conceptual cognitive action). V2P12
Semantic and
associative
processes
Inference operator, i.e. an elementary information process that hypothesises
new relations between symbols (Akin 1979).
V1P1
Generalisation operator, i.e. an elementary information process that
associates attributes with supra-symbols (Akin 1979).
V1P1
Analogical reasoning, i.e. using information about known semantic concepts
to understand newly presented concepts.
V1P6
Seeing as, i.e. the process of proposing properties/attributes for a design
based on metaphors and analogies.
V2P3
Reinterpretation, i.e. assigning new functions to parts of a design through
interpreting visuo-spatial elements and relations in sketches.
V2P4
The analysis and interpretation stages in the process of seeing, i.e. identifying
attributes of a perceived object, and using this information to categorise the
object based on information stored in memory.
V2P5
Visual perception Data input operator, i.e. an elementary information process dealing with
afferent sensory information from the external world (Chan 1990).
V1P1
The perceiving stage in the process of seeing, i.e. identifying and combining
primitive visual elements, and consciously sensing the resulting visuo-spatial
representation.
V2P5
Attending to visual features of sketch elements (perceptual cognitive action). V2P10
Attending to spatial relations among sketch elements (perceptual cognitive
action).
Organising or comparing sketch elements (perceptual cognitive action). V2P10
Unexpected discovery, i.e. perceiving a visuo-spatial feature/relation in a
sketch thatwas unintentionally created and is therefore unexpected. Includes
discovery of: (i) the shape, size, or texture of a sketch element; (ii) a spatial or
organisational relation among elements; and (iii) a space that exists between
elements.
V2P13
Mental imagery
processing
The generation stage in the process of imagining during visual reasoning. V2P5
The maintenance stage in the process of imagining during visual reasoning.
The transformation stage in the process of imagining during visual
reasoning.
1 Code identifier (ID) elements: V = viewpoint number; P = process number. Please refer to Table 8 (Appendix A)
for a list of authors investigating each process.
Finally, whilst identifying, defining, and organising cognitive processes to be
reported in this paper, we were struck by the following question: what cognitive
processes exist in a conceptual design context, and how should they be defined
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and organised for study? The structure of Table 8 presented us with an effective
reporting framework; however, it may be less effective as a foundation for
future empirical work. This discussion aligns with current efforts in cognitive
neuroscience to develop a shared ontology of mental processes, representations,
and tasks (Poldrack et al. 2011; Poldrack 2015). Whilst several design ontologies
exist (e.g. Gero 1990; Sim & Duffy 2003; Gero & Kannengiesser 2004, 2007),
they are not necessarily intended to describe cognitive processes and those that
do are not comprehensive. For example, Gero’s situated FBS ontology describes
design in terms of broad interpretation, transformation, and focusing processes,
encompassing more specific cognitive processes that are only briefly mentioned
(Gero & Kannengiesser 2004, 2007). A general, shared ontology of cognitive
processes in conceptual design would not only provide a rational basis for model
and theory development, but would also increase study comparability and foster
a more integrated body of knowledge on design cognition. Furthermore, an
ontology consistent with cognitive psychology and neuroscience would increase
the capability for design cognition research to contribute to the broader body of
scientific knowledge on human cognition.
5.3. Review limitations
We found that whilst a systematic review is a significant undertaking, it
is a valuable approach for building a rich and comprehensive map of an
area. Nonetheless, there are limitations and lessons to be learned. Firstly, we
encountered considerable difficulties in defining suitable search terms (Table 1).
For instance, applying the terms design* and protocol* returns hundreds of
thousands of irrelevant hits from other fields owing to the ubiquitous phrases
‘experimental design’ and ‘experimental protocol’. Some of our early test runs
returned over a million results. This, coupled with the multitude of potential
cognition keywords (e.g. conceive, thinking, memory, fixation, etc.) makes it
difficult to conduct an exhaustive search. Secondly, we found that the titles and
abstracts of design research articles often lack key details on study focus and
findings. This caused substantial difficulties during both the (i) identification and
(ii) screening phases of the review (Figure 1): (i) search terms were not always
reflected in the titles and abstracts of relevant articles, but searching the full text
returned an unmanageable number of hits; and (ii) rather than screening abstracts
to determine article relevance as suggested by the PRISMA statement, we were
often forced to read larger portions of the paper thereby protracting the process
considerably.
As the numbers in Figure 1 convey, we have covered a significant portion of
the field; however, owing to the above issues, we have still missed certain relevant
publications. For example, Danielescu et al. (2012) report a protocol study on
problem structuring (relevant to Section 3.2), which meets our inclusion criteria
(Table 2). This article was not captured by our searches as the combination of
terms applied did not appear in the search fields. We spent significant time and
effort trialling different search terms in an attempt to minimise the exclusion of
relevant material. We would advise other systematic reviewers to do the same;
furthermore, we would suggest that search terms are informed by a background
review covering key terminology and concepts in the area of interest. We would
also urge design researchers (ourselves and colleagues included) to consider the
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possibility that their articles may eventually form part of a systematic review
when constructing titles and abstracts, especially given the rising number of these
reviews in our field (e.g. Jiang & Yen 2009; Blizzard & Klotz 2012; Erkarslan
2013).
6. Conclusion
This paper reports findings from the first systematic review of protocol studies
focusing specifically on conceptual design cognition. We reviewed 47 studies on
architectural design, engineering design and product design engineering in order
to answer the following research question: What is our current understanding of
the cognitive processes involved in conceptual design tasks carried out by individual
designers? In total, 35 distinct cognitive processes were identified. This paper
reports a subset of 24 processes investigated in 33 studies aligning with two
viewpoints on designing discussed in the broader literature: (V1) design as search
(10 processes, 41.7%); and (V2) design as exploration (14 processes, 58.3%). Our
review forms part of a broader effort to provide a more unified view of the field,
and the remaining cognitive processes will be reported in a future paper on this
theme.
Our central finding is that protocol studies vary considerably with respect to
the concepts and terminology used to describe design cognition. Nonetheless,
several broad commonalities may be observed, including a focus on memory,
semantic, associative, visual perceptual andmental imagery processes. Differences
between studies aligning with search (V1) and exploration (V2) may be partly
explained by underlying paradigmatic differences; however, they also highlight a
lack of general models and theories of conceptual design cognition. Given that
these formalisms can be applied to generate and test predictions about design
cognition that may advance knowledge in the field, their development constitutes
a critical challenge. Two further suggested challenges for the field are: (i) testing
protocol study findings using objective methods conducive to larger participant
samples and (ii) developing a shared ontology of cognitive processes in conceptual
design, to foster a more integrated and scientifically valuable body of knowledge
on the phenomenon.
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Appendix A. Cognitive processes reported
The 24 cognitive processes identified from studies on design as search and
exploration are presented below. Each process is assigned a code identifier
consisting of a viewpoint (V) and process number (P) e.g. V1P1.
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Table 8. Overview of cognitive processes investigated in protocol studies on design as search and exploration
ID Cognitive processes
investigated
Description NP 1 Authors Domains2
VIEWPOINT 1: DESIGN AS SEARCH
V1P1 Operators Operators are elementary processes transforming information
from input to output states. They are the basic component of
search (V1P4) and problem structuring (V1P8) processes. Search
methods and control strategies are particular sequences of
operators applied to reach a solution and manage the search
process, respectively. Operators investigated in the reviewed
studies fall into 4 categories: information gathering;
comprehending, representing, and structuring information;
generating and synthesising; and evaluating and decision making.
5 Akin 1979; Chan
1990; Stauffer &
Ullman 1991; Goel
1995
AD; ED
V1P2 Retrieval of operators
and other information
from long-term memory.
Knowledge of operators (V1P1) is stored within schemas (i.e.
networks of knowledge units) in a designer’s long-term memory.
During designing, relevant schemas are retrieved from long-term
memory and the operators activated in working memory. They
then act on other kinds of recalled information, e.g. technical
knowledge, knowledge of past solutions, etc., to effect a change in
the problem structure or design state.
2 Akin 1979; Chan
1990; Stauffer &
Ullman 1991
AD; ED
V1P3 Activation and
manipulation of
operators and other
information in working
memory.
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Table 8. (continued)
V1P4 Solution search The process of transforming knowledge states in a problem space
through operator execution (V1P1), beginning with the problem
state and progressing through intermediate design states until the
goal (i.e. solution) state is reached. State transformations may be: (i)
lateral, i.e. moving between different ideas; or (ii) vertical, i.e.
increasing the level of detail of the same idea.
5 Akin 1979; Eckersley
1988; Chan 1990;
Stauffer & Ullman
1991; Goel 1995;
Chen & Zhao 2006
AD; ED
V1P5 Inference The process of making logical judgements based on pre-existing
information (e.g. prior knowledge or previous judgements) rather
than direct observations. Both inductive and deductive inference
may be involved in designing.
5 Eckersley 1988;
Lloyd & Scott 1994
ED
V1P6 Analogical reasoning The process of using information about known semantic concepts
to understand newly presented concepts, e.g. those contained
within a design problem. This may be executed in a largely
subconscious, automatic fashion using schemas retrieved from
long-term memory (V1P2), and is often viewed as a form of
inductive reasoning (see V1P5).
16 Ball et al. 2004;
Liikkanen & Perttula
2009
ED; PDE
V1P7 Case-based reasoning. The process of consciously mapping knowledge of previously
encountered problems onto a current problem in order to generate
concepts for solutions. Case-based reasoning may also be viewed as
a form of inductive reasoning (see V1P5).
16 Ball et al. 2004 AD; ED;
PDE
V1P8 Problem structuring The process of defining the design problem prior to or during
solution search (V1P4). It involves gathering information, setting
goals, and establishing constraints. Restructuring the problem
results in changes to the nature and/or structure of goals,
constraints, and/or requirements.
5 Akin 1979; Chan
1990; Goel 1995
AD; ED
V1P9 Problem decomposition The process of breaking a design problem down into sub-problems
by specifying sub-goals (involved in problem structuring, V1P8).
8 Lloyd & Scott 1994;
Liikkanen & Perttula
2009; Lee et al. 2014
AD; ED;
PDE
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Table 8. (continued)
V1P10 Problem reframing The process of recognising restrictive frames of reference and
specifying new ones that are conducive to solving a problem.
Suitable frames of reference are determined using declarative and
procedural domain knowledge retrieved from memory (V1P2).
5 Akin & Akin 1996;
Chandrasekera et al.
2013
AD
VIEWPOINT 2: DESIGN AS EXPLORATION
V2P1 Co-evolution of design
problems and solutions
The process of developing a solution to a design problem whilst
simultaneously structuring/restructuring the problem. The
designer’s task environment is subdivided into: (i) a problem space,
encompassing design requirements; and (ii) a solution space,
encompassing design solutions. The problem space is the basis for
evaluating ideas in the solution space, whilst the solution space is
the basis for evaluating/re-evaluating requirements in the problem
space. Space interactions may add new variables to both (e.g. new
requirements and new solutions), thereby changing the focus of
designing.
9* Dorst & Cross 2001;
Maher & Tang 2003;
Maher & Kim 2006;
Yu et al. 2014
AD; PDE
V2P2 Visual reasoning Broadly speaking, the process of generating and reasoning about
ideas whilst sketching. Visual reasoning is conceptualised in two
ways, namely as: a process of seeing that and seeing as (V2P3); and
interacting seeing (V2P5), imagining (V2P6), and drawing (V2P7)
processes.
4 Goldschmidt 1991;
Won 2001; Park &
Kim 2007
AD; PDE
V2P3 Seeing as and seeing that Two modes of reasoning that a designer continually shifts between
during conceptual sketching: (i) seeing as, i.e. proposing
properties/attributes for a design based on metaphors and analogies;
and (ii) seeing that, i.e. rationalising design decisions relating to
these proposals.
5 Goldschmidt 1991;
Won 2001
AD; PDE
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Table 8. (continued)
V2P4 Reinterpretation The process of assigning new functions to parts of a design by
interpreting visuo-spatial elements and relations in sketches.
Reinterpretation is classed as a functional cognitive action (V2P8).
1 Suwa et al. 1998a,
2000
AD
V2P5 Seeing The process of perceiving, analysing, and interpreting visual
information from external representations during sketching. Seeing
is considered to interact with the processes of imagining (V2P6) and
drawing (V2P7).
2 Park & Kim 2007 PDE
V2P6 Imagining The process of generating new internal images, which may be
transformed according to particular schemas (see V1P4) and
maintained for externalisation via the process of drawing (V2P7).
Images may be generated using perceptual information from the
process of seeing (V2P5), and/or schemas retrieved from long-term
memory.
V2P7 Drawing The process of evaluating and confirming internal images produced
through the process of imagining (V2P6), before externalising them
to produce an external representation.
V2P8 Cognitive actions during
sketching
A set of interdependent processes involved in sketching that pertain
to sensory information (V2P9), perceptual information (V2P10), and
semantic information (V2P11 and V2P12). The processes arguably
correspond to basic levels of human information processing.
5 Suwa et al. 1998a,
2000; Kavakli & Gero
2001, 2002; Bilda &
Demirkan 2003;
Bilda et al. 2006;
Bilda & Gero 2007;
Sun et al. 2013
AD; PDE
V2P9 Physical actions A set of processes pertaining to sensory information during
sketching (V2P8), including: (i) making depictions; and (ii) looking
at previous depictions.
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Table 8. (continued)
V2P10 Perceptual actions A set of processes pertaining to perceptual (visual) information
during sketching (V2P8), including: (i) attending to visual features;
(ii) attending to spatial relations; and (iii) organising or comparing
elements.
V2P11 Functional actions A set of processes pertaining to semantic (functional) information
during sketching (V2P8), including: (i) exploring interactions
between artefacts and people/nature; and (ii) considering the
psychological reactions of people.
V2P12 Conceptual actions A set of processes pertaining to semantic (conceptual) information
during sketching (V2P8), including: (i) preferential and aesthetic
evaluation; (ii) setting up goals; and (iii) retrieving knowledge.
V2P13 Unexpected discovery of
visuo-spatial features and
relations in sketches
The process of perceiving a visuo-spatial feature/relation in a sketch
that was created unintentionally and is therefore unexpected. Three
types are proposed, namely discovery of: (i) the shape, size, or
texture of a sketch element; (ii) a spatial or organisational relation
among elements; and (iii) a space existing between elements.
Unexpected discoveries are classed as perceptual actions (V2P10),
and are argued to correlate with the process of situated invention
(V2P14).
2 Suwa et al. 2000;
Suwa 2003; Yu et al.
2013
AD
V2P14 Situated invention of
design requirements
The process of developing new design requirements based on what
is perceived in sketches. Situated invention involves defining goals
focusing on new issues identified during sketching (a conceptual
action, V2P12), and abstracting these to form new design
requirements. Situated invention is argued to correlate with the
process of unexpected discovery (V2P13).
1 NP = mean number of participants in cited studies.
2 Domain abbreviations: AD= architectural design; ED= engineering design; PDE= product design engineering.
∗ Number of participants not reported by all cited authors.
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